Buy your favorite Books

Breaking News

Afghanistan-Taliban issue ,US invasion of Afghanistan




2018 conference on reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan authorities:
  • In November, 2018, Russia hosted a regional conference on Afghanistan to nudge the reconciliation process between the Taliban and the Afghan authorities.
  • The Taliban were represented by the political council chief, Sher Mohammad Stanikzai.
  • Representatives from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, the U.S. and India were also present at the meeting, making it the first time that all stakeholders were present in the same room.
Representation from various countries:
  • Afghanistan: Afghanistan was represented by the High Peace Council (HPC), set up and supported by the government with the specific aim of furthering peace talks, though formally not part of government.
    • HPC represented Afghanistan because Taliban were opposed to attending if the Afghan government insisted on co-chairing the meeting.
  • India: India sent two seasoned former diplomats, with the Ministry of External Affairs describing its participation as “non-official”.
  • US: It was represented by its Moscow embassy officials.
No final statements from the conference:
  • Aware of the differences, the Russians refrained from attempting a final statement or even a group photograph.
  • Nevertheless, with this meeting, Russia has sent a clear signal that it is back in the game in Afghanistan.

Background on political solution or reconciliation with Taliban in Afghanistan
The idea of reconciliation with the Taliban (political solution) is an old one:
  • The idea of reconciliation with the Taliban in Afghanistan has been around for over a decade.
  • As the Taliban insurgency grew 2005 onwards, the British, deployed in Helmand, soon found merit in doing side deals with local Taliban commanders by turning a blind eye to opium production in the area.
  • With the help of the Germans and the Norwegians, they began to persuade the U.S. to work for a political outcome.
But US opted for a heavy counter-insurgency policy:
  • After being elected in 2008, President Barack Obama ordered a full-scale review of the U.S.’s Afghanistan policy.
  • After extracting an assurance from the generals that the insurgency would be defeated in 18 months, Mr. Obama announced a shift to counter-insurgency mode with a surge of over 40,000 troops.
  • He however added that phased drawdown of troops would begin in end-2011.
It didn't succeed due to Pakistan:
  • The U.S. soon realised that it had run out of options.
  • The US realized that insurgency in Afghanistan could not be contained as long as sanctuaries existed in Pakistan.
  • Yet, the carrot and stick policy with Pakistan had cost the U.S. $33 billion but failed to change Pakistan’s policy.
  • A total cut-off was not possible as long as U.S. troops in Afghanistan depended on supply lines through Pakistan.
Counter-insurgency handed over to Afghan forces in 2014:
  • Operation Enduring Freedom formally ended in December 2014, handing over primary responsibility for combat operations to the Afghan security forces even as the insurgency gained ground.

Political solution was necessitated after counter-insurgency's failure:
  • In 12 years, the U.S. had lost 2,300 soldiers and spent $105 billion in rebuilding Afghanistan without much success.
  • It was more than the $103 billion (in inflation-adjusted terms) spent under the Marshall Plan on rebuilding West Europe after World War II.
  • War weariness demanded an exit and a political solution was unavoidable.
  1. First step of Taliban office in 2013 did not work out:
  • After prolonged negotiations, a Taliban office opened in Doha in June 2013 to promote talks and a peace process.
  • However, when the office started flying the Taliban flag, calling itself the political bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, it angered both the U.S. and Afghan governments.
  • The office was closed down through the Qatar authorities continue to host Taliban leaders.
  1. A fresh start in 2014 by Ghani:
  • Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, who came to power in 2014, moved to improve relations with Pakistan, even calling on then Army Chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, at the GHQ, to push for reconciliation.
  • Setback due to leadership problems in Taliban and increase in insurgency:
    • Preliminary talks were derailed in July 2015 when Mr. Ghani learned that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died over two years earlier.
    • An internal power struggle within the Taliban erupted with Mullah Akhtar Mansour emerging as the leader.
    • Insurgency grew with the Taliban briefly taking over Kunduz and Ghormach districts and threatening Ghazni.
    • Mr. Ghani felt betrayed and lashed out, accusing Pakistan of “waging war”.
  1. Quadrilateral Coordination Group created in 2016 to revive talks with Taliban:
  • A new initiative (Quadrilateral Coordination Group) involving the U.S., China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was launched in January 2016.
  • After a couple of meetings, it was agreed that Pakistan will use its influence to get the Taliban to the negotiating table.
  • Again derailed due to Taliban's demands:
    • The hopes of reconciliation were dashed again when the Taliban demanded the exit of foreign troops, the release of detainees from Guantanamo, and removal of its leaders from international blacklists.
    • Frustrated with Pakistan’s inability to get Mullah Mansour to fall in line, the U.S. eliminated him in a drone strike in May 2016 in Balochistan.
    • Maulvi Haibatullah was appointed as his successor.
    • Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan:
      • Meanwhile, there were signs that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan were converging under the banner of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan’s northern and eastern provinces.
  • Russia finds a place for itself on the Afghanistan problem:
    • In December 2015, Russia publicly acknowledged that it had “communication channels with the Taliban for exchange of information” and “a shared interest with the Taliban to counter the threat posed by the IS”.
    • Clearly, Russia was getting back into the game.
  1. Preliminary consultations failed in 2017:
  • Preliminary consultations were held in 2017, at which Afghan officials (and senior Indian diplomats) were present.
  • However, the Taliban declined to share the table with the Afghan government.
  1. Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation launched in 2018:
  • Mr. Ghani launched the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, and in February 2018, made an unconditional dialogue offer to the Taliban.
  • The Taliban rejected his overture, declaring that they were ready to engage in direct talks only with the Americans.
  • Mr. Ghani persisted, resulting in a three-day ceasefire during Eid.
  • The U.S. softened its stand on an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process”, and in July, senior State Department official Alice Wells was in Doha for a meeting with the Taliban.
  • In September, the State Department announced the appointment of Zalmay Khalilzad (former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan) as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation. 

Meanwhile, the security situation in Afghanistan continues to worsen:
  • Today, the Afghan government controls barely half the country, with one-sixth under Taliban control and the rest contested.
  • Most significant is the ongoing depletion in the Afghan security forces because of casualties, desertions and a growing reluctance to join.
This necessitated multiple processes to improve the situation:
  • US' new South Asia policy: U.S. President Donald Trump’s South Asia policy was announced in August 2017 aimed at breaking the military stalemate by expanding the U.S. and NATO presence.
  • Putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities has clearly failed, and this is why multiple processes are underway.
  • Everyone agrees that the war has to end; the question for the U.S. is how to manage the optics of the exit while not conceding victory to the Taliban.

India demonstrates a commitment to a stable, independent, and peaceful Afghanistan:
  • Pragmatism dictates that India remains engaged with the multiple processes underway.
  • Since July 2011, when the former President (and Chair of the HPC) Burhanuddin Rabbani visited Delhi, India has supported an ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ peace process.
  • Last month, during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s India visit, both countries expressed their commitment to the Moscow Format (that is, the Russian initiative to find a solution).
  • India's presence is recognition that its economic cooperation programs make it the most widely accepted development partner.
  • Peace remains elusive but India’s engagement demonstrates a commitment to the idea of a stable, independent, and peaceful Afghanistan.


1 comment:

Welcome to the world of the seekers